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The Fault in Legal Ethics*
Anthony T. Kronman**
Two old and antagonistic traditions of thought shape the mod-
ern field of legal ethics. One of these has its beginnings in Aris-
totle’s political philosophy, and the other in the contractarian
theories of Hobbes and Locke. Both traditions influenced the de-
sign of the American republic, whose founders combined elements
from each in a new and volatile synthesis marked by tensions that
have been a part of our public life ever since. Our view of the legal
profession—of what lawyers do and ought to do—is the product of
a similarly unstable combination of elements drawn from these two
traditions, and many of the most familiar and seemingly intractable
disagreements within the field of legal ethics, the fault lines along
which opinion seems forever to divide, are a consequence of the
effort to join, in a single view of the lawyer’s role, such strikingly
different conceptions of political morality.
At different moments in our history, one of these traditions has
been more influential than the other. In the early years of the re-
public, it was the Aristotelian conception of the lawyer’s role—the
republican conception—that dominated the discussion of profes-
sional ethics. In the last half century, the contractarian conception
has achieved a comparable intellectual and moral dominance.
There are signs that this may now be changing, that the influence of
republican ideas is once again growing within the field of legal eth-
ics. I shall have more to say about this later in my talk. But first I
need to define my terms, to tell you what I mean by the republican
and contractarian traditions, and to explain how these traditions
and the conflict between them have shaped our complex and unsta-
ble understanding of what lawyers do.
At the beginning of his treatise on politics, from which the
whole tradition of republican political philosophy derives, Aristotle
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makes a famous claim about the value of political action. To lead a
complete human life, he says, a person must participate in the polit-
ical affairs of his city; he must play an active role in its government
and in the administration of its laws. Someone who devotes himself
entirely to the private affairs of his household and to the business of
making money—to economic life, which Aristotle considered
merely an extension of household activity—misses out, he says, on
an experience that is essential to human fulfillment, the experience
of sharing the responsibilities of political rule with a group of fellow
citizens who, unlike the other members of one’s household—the
women and children and slaves—possess a capacity for indepen-
dent action equal to one’s own. For Aristotle, this experience is
unique to human beings—animals are incapable of political rule
and the gods possess too much independence for it. The life of a
man who has no share in the government of his city thus lacks a
defining human element. It is a life either of beastly necessity (as it
is for those who spend all their time on household matters) or one
of divine independence (which only heroes with godlike powers
ever experience) but in neither case is it a life of a distinctly human
kind, with the sort of fulfillment that human beings alone enjoy.
To this first claim Aristotle joins a second. A city, he says, is
more than a group of people living together for their mutual mate-
rial advantage. It is a system of laws that embodies a conception of
right living, a shared view of the most appropriate way for human
beings to conduct themselves in their relations with one another
and with the gods. A city is an association held together by a set of
laws that embodies, as we would say today, a conception of the
good, and if any such association is to outlast its foundation, if it is
to endure for a meaningful length of time, some among its members
(a sufficient number, however many that may be) must feel an alle-
giance to it and be prepared to sacrifice themselves on its behalf. If
a city is to survive, some of its citizens must possess the self-sacrific-
ing habit of devotion that we commonly call the habit of patriotism.
A city without patriots can never be anything but a confederacy of
convenience with no more permanence than the changeable eco-
nomic interests that hold it together. It is therefore essential, in Ar-
istotle’s view, that the founders of a city, and every generation of
citizens that follows, take care to ensure that their successors pos-
sess the proper patriotic spirit, which cannot be expected to develop
spontaneously but requires a long process of education, of soul
shaping, that must be closely supervised from the start. This is why
Aristotle’s account of politics leads naturally to a discussion of edu-
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cation, a topic that in fact receives more attention than any other in
his treatise.
For Aristotle, then, the human soul needs civic life and without
it remains unfulfilled and incomplete. And civic life, in turn, needs
properly trained souls that have acquired, through their education,
the habit of patriotism or political love. These two ideas are central
to Aristotle’s political philosophy and to the long tradition of re-
publican thought that is founded upon it. But in the seventeenth
century a new tradition of thought arose that deliberately chal-
lenged these ideas. Often called the “contractarian” tradition be-
cause it seeks to defend the political arrangements of human beings
as the outcome, real or imagined, of a pre-political agreement
among those living under these arrangements, this new line of
thought starts with Hobbes and Locke and has had distinguished
defenders in every subsequent period, including our own.
The contractarian view of politics, which fit so well the emer-
gent system of nation states in early modern Europe and the dy-
namic forms of capitalist enterprise that were simultaneously
transforming Europe’s age-old economic order, repudiates the re-
publican conception of politics in two crucial respects. First, con-
tractarianism depicts the whole realm of politics in purely
instrumental terms, as a device for pacifying the world so that its
human inhabitants can continue to pursue, as safely and cheaply as
possible, the truly important, non-political activities in which they
are engaged. Political life, on the contractarian view, is not an arena
of self-fulfillment in which essential human powers are developed
and deployed; it is not, as it is for Aristotle, a source of intrinsic
satisfaction in a complete human life. It is merely a condition, albeit
a necessary one, for achieving such satisfaction, which is only to be
found in activities, material or spiritual, of a non-political kind. The
claim that politics is of instrumental value only, that it is merely a
means to an end and not an end in itself, marks the first great point
of conflict between the contractarian and republican traditions of
thought.
The second concerns the nature of political cohesion, the force
that holds political communities together. A city will survive, on
Aristotle’s view, only if some of its citizens are devoted to it, only if
they love it and are prepared to sacrifice themselves on its behalf.
The great contractarian philosophers of the seventeenth century
claimed, by contrast, that commonwealths are held together by self-
interest, not patriotic love. Individuals, they said, can see the advan-
tages of forming commonwealths and of remaining in them once
established by looking to their private welfare alone; no other mo-
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tive is needed to produce a widespread habit of law-abidingness and
the political cohesion that flows from it, and no other, they insisted,
is sufficiently powerful to achieve this result. On a contractarian
view, states are held together not because their citizens care most
intensely about something other than themselves, but precisely be-
cause they care so exclusively about their own well-being and rec-
ognize that it is best secured by behaving as the law requires. It
follows, as Hobbes openly conceded, that when a political associa-
tion asks its members to risk their lives in order to protect it, their
motives for law-abidingness come to an end and they have no duty
to comply, which is to say they have no duty to be patriots, for the
willingness to take such risks is the standard by which all patriotism
must finally be measured. And it also follows from the con-
tractarian view of political cohesion that no scheme of education is
required to achieve it since the passion of self-interest that holds
states together is a natural feeling anterior to any educational expe-
rience and not, like the habit of patriotic love, an affect acquired
only through a process of long and careful cultivation. It is re-
vealing, in this regard, that while Aristotle devotes a large portion
of his treatise on politics to the topic of education, there is virtually
no mention of the subject in Hobbes’s Leviathan.
These two traditions of thought, the republican and the con-
tractarian express deeply different, indeed antithetical, views of po-
litical order. Both were alive in the culture of the eighteenth
century which the founders of the American republic inhabited and
both played an important role in the design of the new government
they fashioned. For some time now historians have debated the
question of which tradition dominated the thinking of the founders
and the constitutional scheme they invented. In the last generation,
the prevailing view was that of Louis Hartz, who saw the American
constitution as an embodiment of Lockean liberalism. In our gener-
ation, the balance of historical judgment has shifted, and scholars
like Bailyn and Pocock and Wood, who emphasize the republican
spirit of the founding, enjoy, for the moment, a greater prestige
than their rivals. But this rivalry can never be settled, and there will
always be defenders of each view, because our constitution is a
composite of elements drawn from different traditions and joined in
a permanently volatile mix.
Just as the view we take of our political system oscillates be-
tween republican and contractarian extremes, so too does our view
of the legal profession. There are, in fact, two opposing ways of
describing the American lawyer’s role and responsibilities, one that
starts from republican and the other from contractarian premises.
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Each description yields a sharply different view of what lawyers do
and ought to do, of their function and duties in the American politi-
cal system. Though each pretends to be a complete account,
neither, in the end, can be, for the nature of the American legal
profession, like that of the larger society it serves, has from the start
been defined, with a kind of moral schizophrenia, partly in republi-
can and partly in contractarian terms. This schizophrenia is the
source of a permanent division in our thinking about the legal pro-
fession, and many of the most familiar dilemmas of legal ethics,
which can be restated with endless variety but never really solved,
trace their origins to it.
The republican conception of the American legal profession
might be said to begin with Madison’s celebrated solution to the
problem of factionalism, a solution he famously described as “a re-
publican cure for a republican disease.” The problem of political
factions was a central difficulty for classical republicanism and
Madison proposed to solve it, in effect, not by limiting its scope (as
earlier writers had proposed) but by broadening it instead, by en-
couraging a wider range and a greater variety of factions, in the
belief that their competition would prevent the dominance of any
one faction over all the others—the chief evil to be avoided. In
Madison’s view, a continental republic, instead of being an oxymo-
ron as others had insisted, offered, in fact, the key to solving one of
republicanism’s most challenging problems. At the same time, how-
ever, it created a new difficulty that anyone committed to the re-
publican tradition had to take quite seriously. For the very
broadening of the political realm that reduced the dangers of fac-
tionalism was bound simultaneously to lengthen the cord by which
each citizen was attached to the republic and thereby to weaken the
spirit of patriotic devotion on which, all republican thinkers agreed,
the survival of every political association depends. In a Madisonian
republic of continental scale, there might be, perhaps, episodic
bursts of patriotic feeling, but these, he guessed, would likely be as
thin as they were wide, and a source less of stability than disorder.
Where, in such a republic, might a stable repository of such feeling
be found? No true republican could rely on the interplay of factions
to provide a complete substitute for patriotism, but where, in a con-
tinental republic, might a spirit of patriotism, of selfless public-spir-
itedness, be nurtured and conveyed from one generation to the
next?
One answer to this question, which gained currency during the
first half-century after the founding, portrayed lawyers as a particu-
larly important source of public-spiritedness in a large and fractious
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republic. The groups classically associated with a special devotion
to the public good had always been defined in hereditary or pecuni-
ary terms, as an aristocratic or oligarchic class. The idea that patri-
otism might be linked to a person’s professional role rather than his
parentage or wealth was a new one, but in a country without an
aristocracy and rapid fluctuations of wealth, the notion of such a
linkage held out the only hope of securing what, on a republican
view, still seemed a vital condition of political life. Tocqueville,
Durkheim and others have since made this idea familiar, but it was
to begin with a republican invention, adapted to American condi-
tions, and its first and most natural application was to the profes-
sion of law.
The training lawyers receive, and the role they play in adminis-
tering the law, give them, republican writers argued, a respect for
the law and a devotion to it that other pursuits do not encourage to
the same degree. Because of this, it was claimed, lawyers are partic-
ularly likely to possess an attitude of public-spiritedness and
uniquely well-positioned to carry this attitude into the wider sphere
of private, and especially commercial, life, where self-interest is
strongest and contractarian norms are widely embraced. According
to this view, which still has many defenders today, lawyers are both
well-suited and temperamentally inclined on account of their pro-
fessional experience to play a leading role in the affairs of their
community, forming its most reliable class of patriots and sharing a
devotion to the public good that serves as a counterweight to more
widespread habits of self-interest whose dominance is always a
threat to political stability as republican theory conceives it.
There is, of course, another view of the legal profession, one
that starts from contractarian premises. For the contractarian, the
legal order is merely a modus vivendi and no one’s self-sacrificing
devotion is required to sustain it. All citizens are private individuals
seeking merely to advance their own self-interest within the limits
of the law, which they respect solely for reasons of self-interest too.
In any even moderately developed legal system, however, the num-
ber and complexity of norms quickly outgrows the capacity of most
citizens to comprehend. A need therefore arises, even in a strictly
contractarian community, for a class of experts, well-versed in the
law, who can assist their fellow citizens in navigating the shoals and
channels of the legal order. This is the role that lawyers play on a
contractarian view of their function. Lawyers help clients pursue
their self-interest by providing the legal expertise that clients lack.
They do not bring to this task a devotion to the public good, much
less force it upon their clients. From time to time, a lawyer may
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remind his client that he must obey the law, but only because it is in
the client’s interest to do so. In this respect, as in all others, a lawyer
takes his client’s self-interest for granted, treating it in the same way
the client does, as the sole basis of his value judgments, and merely
supplying the expertise which the client needs in order to pursue his
self-interest as effectively as possible within a complex legal system.
On this contractarian view of the lawyer’s function, lawyers are no
more public-spirited than their clients. They possess a greater
knowledge of the law’s requirements, but no greater devotion to
the legal order. Seen in this light, lawyers are instruments, pure and
simple, whose only commitment is to advance their clients’ interests
within the limits of the law, a commitment that in turn is founded
upon their own commercial interest in a satisfied clientele. This
view of the legal profession, inspired by the contractarian tradition
and drawing moral strength from it, has always had supporters and,
like its republican counterpart, remains influential today.
All that I have just said is well-known, certainly to this audi-
ence. What is less often noticed, perhaps, is that the central
problems of legal ethics are likely to appear in a different light de-
pending on which view of the profession one takes, republican or
contractarian. Different ethical issues tend to stand out from these
two points of view—so much so, in fact, that the whole field of pro-
fessional responsibility may appear to have an entirely distinct sub-
ject-matter when seen from one perspective than it does when
surveyed from the other.
Consider, first, the contractarian view of the lawyer’s role.
From this vantage point, questions of permissibility are almost cer-
tain to seem the most pressing in any discussion of legal ethics. The
principal ethical challenge for lawyers will be to determine the lim-
its of what they are permitted to do on their clients’ behalf. On a
contractarian view, lawyers are assumed to embrace their clients’
own self-interest, and to exert a maximum of zeal in its pursuit. The
only real issue concerns the boundaries of what is allowable in this
endeavor. Of course, that is the paramount ethical issue for the cli-
ent as well, whose goal is to advance his interest as far as he is able
within the limits of the law, so that in this respect the lawyer’s ethi-
cal situation is likely to appear, from a contractarian perspective,
essentially identical to the client’s.
In any contractarian scheme of legal ethics, there will also be a
strong tendency to reduce the notion of public-spiritedness to the
idea of self-interest by relying heavily on the concept of adversarial
justice and the invisible hand arguments that are commonly offered
to support it. A lawyer serves the public good, these arguments all
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claim, by serving his client as zealously as possible, just as, in Adam
Smith’s famous image, the baker serves society by looking to the
profits of his business. In each case, it is said, the public good is
promoted not by seeking to advance it directly, but through indirec-
tion, by many individuals separately pursuing their own self-interest
instead. The great attraction of all such arguments, from a con-
tractarian point of view, is that they effectively eliminate the ten-
sion between public-spiritedness and private interest that
republicanism takes for granted and from which it derives much of
its appeal as a conception of government and law. For a con-
tractarian, the idea of adversarial justice, of a system of laws in
which the universal pursuit of self-interest, by clients and lawyers
alike, produces a collective good that no one needs to think about,
much less to actively pursue, is likely to seem a compelling response
to the republican’s insistence on the need for a patriotic class, and a
brilliant device for transmuting public actions into private ones.
Traditionally, this idea has been most often invoked, and most
forcefully defended, in the field of criminal law, so that contractari-
ans tend naturally to take criminal lawyers—and criminal defense
lawyers in particular—as their model in thinking about legal ethics,
and to view the dilemmas that all lawyers face, and the meaning of
public-spiritedness in the profession generally, in this light.
Even though a contractarian view of the lawyer’s role sharply
reduces the conflict between zealous representation of clients, on
the one hand, and promotion of the public good, on the other, two
other sorts of conflict remain and within a system of legal ethics
founded upon contractarian principles these become dominant con-
cerns whose centrality gives this system its distinctive character.
The first of these arises because most lawyers have more than one
client. The idea that a lawyer serves the public good by promoting
his clients’ interests with maximum zeal does not eliminate—if any-
thing, it exaggerates—conflicts among these interests themselves.
Even within a contractarian model of law practice, a lawyer will
have multiple allegiances to the interests of his clients, and it be-
comes an important task of legal ethics, on this model, to help law-
yers settle conflicts among these allegiances when they arise. Today,
in many law firms, this is all that legal ethics means.
A second conflict arises, even for the contractarian, from the
fact that a lawyer’s own self-interest is linked to, but also, in one
crucial way at least, distinct from his client’s. A lawyer steps into his
client’s shoes and makes the client’s interests his own, but he does
not do this from love. He does it for a fee. The lawyer is in the
business of being a friend, and from the vantage point of his own
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self-interest, zealous promotion of the client’s welfare has only in-
strumental value, whereas for the client this is of course an end in
itself. Because the lawyer’s self-interest is thus parasitic upon, but
separate from, the client’s own—in the same way that the baker’s
self-interest is parasitic upon but separate from his customers’—
there is always a danger, from the client’s point of view, that the
lawyer he has hired will give him less than has been bargained for.
In every contractual relationship, this one included, the parties have
an incentive to cheat or skimp if they can do it without detection.
All of the rules dealing with lawyers’ fees (from the simple prohibi-
tion against theft to the more complicated rules regarding contin-
gent compensation) are addressed to this problem, which remains—
which indeed becomes especially severe—in a contractarian system
of legal ethics that gives so much weight to the notion of self-inter-
est. Within such a system, the regulation of fees is thus likely to be a
particularly prominent topic, along with the resolution of conflict-
ing commitments to clients.
What are the main features of the conception of legal ethics
that emerges from a republican point of view? First, it will tend to
have a more aspirational tone. The leading question here will not
be, “what is the maximum that a lawyer is permitted to do within a
system of laws?”, but rather, “what are the ideals toward which law-
yers should aspire and how can these be achieved?” A republican
legal ethics will emphasize the obligation of lawyers to be an im-
proving force, and this in two different ways. It will stress that law-
yers have a duty not merely to advance their clients’ self-interest, to
mechanically execute their orders no matter how confused or inat-
tentive to the needs of others these orders may be, but to help their
clients toward a better understanding of what their interest includes
and in particular to see that it includes an other-regarding moral
component whose presence is essential to the clients’ own happi-
ness and fulfillment as members of their community. And it will
stress, too, that lawyers have a duty not merely to accept the law as
a given framework of rules that imposes limits on their clients’ con-
duct and their own, but also to work actively to improve these rules
so that they better serve the good of the community as a whole. In
these respects, a republican legal ethics will tend to be aspirational
and communitarian in character.
Because of this it will also tend to take the counselling relation
as a norm in law practice generally, and to give particular emphasis
to the problems that counselling presents (the problem, for exam-
ple, of deciding how far a lawyer may legitimately go in attempting
to persuade his client to abandon a course of action which, though
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legal, is harmful to others). Indeed, those who see legal ethics from
a republican point of view will be likely to insist that most adver-
sarial relations can in fact be better understood as fitting the coun-
selling model instead, thereby narrowing the domain of adversarial
justice, just as contractarians seek to expand it. Brandeis’s famous
description of himself as “a lawyer for the situation” expresses this
thought nicely.
A third characteristic of republican legal ethics is its emphasis
on what, for lack of a better phrase, I shall call the importance of
the unrepresented. To have an interest is to see things from a point
of view. It is to have a partial and perspectival outlook on things. A
lawyer’s clients have different interests and therefore see the world
from different perspectives. This raises the question of how a law-
yer’s commitments to his clients should be adjusted when they con-
flict. For a contractarian, this is an important problem. It is, in fact,
the only real conflict of allegiances that he acknowledges. But for a
republican, law practice presents another and more serious sort of
conflict: the conflict between the interest of one’s client and the
good of the community as a whole. This is not a conflict between
two different interests, however, for the latter—the good of the
community—is not, strictly speaking, an interest at all. It is not a
perspectival claim or partial attachment to be weighed alongside
others, but, in theory at least, a comprehensive and impartial value
that transcends all limited points of view. It is a comprehensive
good that transcends private interests. But from this it follows that
the public good, unlike private interests, cannot be represented,
since every representation, whether of the public good or anything
else, is made—and indeed can only be made—from a point of view,
which is just what appeals to the public good claim to overcome.
The concept of the public good is therefore an unrepresentable
ideal. For a strict contractarian, the only conflict lawyers ever face is
the conflict between representable interests. Republicans insist that
lawyers also face a conflict between interests of this kind, on the
one hand, and the unrepresentable idea of the public good on the
other. This does not by itself make appeals to the public good inco-
herent, but it means that a republican system of legal ethics must
recognize a duty, on every lawyer’s part, to promote a good that no
set of interests, however diverse, can ever fully capture (Brandeis’s
“situation”). In a contractarian scheme this duty has no place. In a
republican ethics, by contrast, it has central importance and serves
as a constant reminder of what is missing in every legal representa-
tion, of the all-inclusive public good that cannot be represented at
all.
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Just as it is impossible to assign one tradition of thought, the
republican or contractarian, a decisive priority in the political sys-
tem our founders created, it is likewise impossible to say which of
these contains the truth about legal ethics. Each has considerable
force, and can never be discounted completely. One sign of this is
the ease with which the proponents of each view can be ridiculed by
defenders of the other. To the contractarian, a republican concep-
tion of the legal profession is bound to seem undemocratic, disre-
spectful of the equality and independence of persons, the
conception of self-important busybodies who are forever meddling
in their clients’ business, and who, failing to recognize that most
people want simply to pursue their own private interests, are se-
duced by communitarian dreams, which they then proceed, with
aristocratic hauteur, to shove down everyone else’s throat. To a re-
publican, of course, the contractarian view of the lawyer’s role
looks equally pernicious: a demeaning and small-minded view that
turns lawyers into servile tools, protectors of wealth whose work
aggravates the perennial tensions between rich and poor and makes
the social order as a whole more oligarchic and less stable. Each of
these familiar caricatures strikes a responsive chord, and the fact
that it does suggests that neither view contains the whole truth
about lawyers.
One obvious reason for this is that lawyers do a wide range of
things, some of which fit more easily within one model than the
other. Lawyers are counselors, advocates, prosecutors, government
agents and judges. They are protectors, defenders, watchdogs and
inventors. In certain of these roles they must act as a contractarian
view as the legal profession requires, and act irresponsibly if they
do not. But other roles demand a degree of republican civic-mind-
edness and cannot be properly performed without it. Proponents of
each view will of course emphasize the importance of those roles
that fit its assumptions and expectations best, and minimize or neg-
lect those that do not, but the range and variety of tasks that law-
yers legitimately perform make it impossible, in the end, for one
camp to sweep the other from the field.
A second and even more important reason why this cannot be
done is that republicanism and contractarianism are both founded
upon moral and political values which, though deeply opposed, pos-
sess a permanent appeal. Contractarianism celebrates the freedom
of the individual and the entirely legitimate wish to be left alone, to
be allowed to pursue undisturbed one’s own private conception of
fulfillment. It honors the entrepreneurial spirit and expresses a
healthy mistrust of public movements with their zealotry and con-
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formism. Republicanism, by contrast, speaks to the human desire
for community, the wish to be connected to a larger public life that
goes beyond, and outlasts, each person’s private enterprise. And it
recognizes that citizenship involves more than voting, that it re-
quires a concern for the public good and the willingness to make
sacrifices on its behalf, and affirms that there can be no citizenship
worthy of the name without education.
We are not prepared to abandon either of these opposing sets
of values. Each contains important moral truths, however contra-
dictory they seem. At certain times, and in certain circumstances,
one set of values may predominate, but never in the long run and
across the board. Our moral commitments are just too complex for
that. This complexity is a feature of our political system, which fuses
two traditions whose opposing claims have been pulling us in differ-
ent directions from the earliest days of the republic. And it is also a
feature of the professional self-image of American lawyers, whose
vocational ideals are formed by a similar fusion of these same two
traditions. When we look in the mirror we see a hybrid whose val-
ues are drawn partly from one tradition and partly from the other,
and whose moral contradictoriness can never be resolved by elimi-
nating either set of values or even by assigning each to a particular
range of law-jobs in a definitive division of labor. We would have to
be a different people, and a different profession, for that to happen,
and the fact that each tradition continues to be so easily caricatured
by the supporters of the other is a sure indication that it won’t hap-
pen soon.
Still, though both traditions will always have their place in legal
ethics, and though the tension between them can never be finally
settled, each has enjoyed periods of dominance in the history of the
profession, and it may be that we are now at the end of one such
period, and the beginning of another. I want to conclude by offering
a few remarks about the prospects for transition in our field, and by
suggesting one reason why the change that appears to be taking
place may take longer and be less thorough than its advocates
might wish.
Throughout the nineteenth century, and into the early decades
of this one, republican ideals held center stage in the field of legal
ethics. These ideals underwent many subtle permutations, as Bob
Gordon, in particular, has helped us understand, but, broadly
speaking, they retained their centrality in the thinking of the profes-
sion up through the Progressive Era and a bit beyond. In the second
half of the twentieth century, however, the influence of con-
tractarian ideas has increased dramatically. One symptom of this is
2017] THE FAULT IN LEGAL ETHICS 293
the changing form of legal ethics, its evolution from an aspirational
“canon” to a “code” and then an even more sharply drawn set of
“rules,” concerned mainly with questions of permissibility and the
limits on zealous representation. Another is the increased promi-
nence of arguments based on an invisible-hand model of adversarial
justice. Whether there is any causal relation or not, it is interesting
to note that the influence of contractarianism has similarly in-
creased in the field of moral philosophy during this same period,
through the work, especially, of John Rawls, but also of Nozick,
Scanlon, Gauthier and others.
In the last ten years, however, there has been what might fairly
be described as a republican revival in legal ethics. This follows, by
a decade, the renewal of interest in republican ideas among profes-
sional historians that I mentioned earlier, and it coincides with the
neo-republicanism that has acquired such currency in the field of
public law through the writing of Frank Michelman, Cass Sunstein,
Suzanna Sherry and others. Bob Gordon’s work clearly belongs to
this revival, as does Bill Simon’s and Mary Ann Glendon’s. In dif-
ferent ways, David Luban, Michael Kelley, and David Wilkins have
contributed to it, and my own work puts me in their company.
Some in this group have been most interested in theory, others in
problems of law practice. Some have drawn inspiration from his-
tory, others from philosophy. And no two see eye-to-eye on the
meaning of republicanism or its political implications. But still they
form a recognizable group, held together by the conviction that
public-spiritedness is not a hobby for lawyers but an essential com-
ponent of their work without which they cannot do their jobs in an
effective and responsible way, and by the belief that the model of
adversarial justice, however valid in certain respects, is often mis-
leading and always incomplete. These ideas have been making
headway in our field, whose central problems are today conceived,
to a limited but meaningful degree, in more republican terms than
they were ten years ago. Legal ethics is moving back toward a view
of the lawyer’s role in which republican ideas have a larger place
than they have had during the long dominance, in this century, of
contractarian thought.
How far will this movement go, and how quickly will it pro-
ceed? My own view is that the republican revival in legal ethics is
unlikely to move very fast, for the following reason. By far the most
powerful intellectual current in American law teaching today is the
law and economics movement. Law and economics has steadily in-
creased in influence over the past thirty years, and though it is not
without competitors, no other movement can claim a similar
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breadth of support, or show results of a comparably lasting kind.
Today, law and economics has a foothold in every area of law, and
wherever it has acquired significant prestige, republican ideas have
had a harder time winning acceptance, for the economic approach
to law rests on deeply contractarian assumptions. Even in fields like
legal ethics, where law and economics has made only a modest
showing, its successes elsewhere tend to retard the development of
republican thinking. That is because legal ethics is not taught in iso-
lation. It is taught to students who are also studying other subjects,
and their view of the lawyer’s role is importantly shaped by what
they learn in contracts and torts and criminal law even though it
may not be an explicit topic of discussion in these courses. There is
a debate within the field of legal ethics concerning the wisdom of
the so-called “pervasive” method of instruction. But this is in some
ways a false debate, for to paraphrase Holmes, the pervasive
method is not a duty, it is merely a necessity. The views that stu-
dents form of legal ethics cannot help but be influenced by what
they learn in their other classes. What seems morally plausible to
them as students of legal ethics is necessarily a function of what
seems morally plausible to them as students, period. And because
of this, their views of what is sound in legal ethics is bound to be
influenced by the norms of legitimation employed by law and eco-
nomics, which remains today the most potent force in American
academic law, as it has been for more than a quarter-century. So
long as this continues to be true, any revival of republican thought
within our own field is likely to be tentative and weak, given the
powerful boost that law and economics imparts to contractarianism
generally. Whether the law and economics movement retains its
present influence or is, instead, unhorsed by a counter-movement
that effectively challenges its foundational assumptions—feminism
perhaps, or law and literature perhaps, or neorepublicanism per-
haps, or perhaps, most promising of all, a united front comprising
all three—will therefore have a large effect on the direction of
teaching in our field, and on our ability to restore some measure of
balance between the opposing traditions of thought that we have
joined in our wonderfully contradictory American venture.
